Migration Selectivity and the Effects of Public Programs by Rosenzweig, Mark R. & Wolpin, Kenneth I.
Number 84-5  October,  1984
ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  CENTER
r--------'\---  Mo
MIGRATION  SELECTIVITY  AND THE
EFFECTS  OF  PUBLIC  PROGRAMS
Mark R. Rosenzweig
Kenneth  I. Wolpin
ECONOMIC  DEVELOPMENT  CENTER
Department  of Economics, Minneapolis
Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, St. Paul
UNIVERSITY  OF  MINNESOTA
I
IMigration  Selectivity  and  the
Effects  of  Public  Programs
Mark  R.  Rosenzweig
University  of  Minnesota
Kenneth I. Wolpin
Ohio  State  University
October  1984
q-5The use of  cross-sectional data  to estimate models of  consumer or
household behavior or  to  evaluate public  programs has a long and continuing
tradition  in economics  (e.g., Feldstein  (1978),  Meyer and Wise (1983),
Johnson  (1983),  Pencavel  (1984)).  The treatment of  cross-sectional or
area-specific variation in  prices or  program characteristics as exogenous
would appear, however, inconsistent with the  Tiebout hypothesis  (1956)  that
agents,heterogenous  in  preferences  or  endowments,locate  in  response  to  and/or
select local program levels according to those preferences.  If  so,  cross-
sectional correlations between the observed behavior of agents and relative
prices  or  program  levels  will  not correspond  to  true  price  or  program  effects
for  any  individual  agent.
While  some  studies  have  shown  that  local  laws  reflect  the  preferences  of
local  populations  (Landes  (1980),  Farber  (1984)),  such  studies  appear  to  assume
that  interregional differences in population preferences are exogenous.
Heterogeneity and selective-migration imply, however, that site-specific changes
in prices or programs, whatever their source, will alter endogenously the char-
acteristics and size of  the population at the  site, possibly inducing conse-
quences  unanticipated  by  the  law-makers.  Todaro's  classic  article  (1969)
presents  a  theoretical  example  in  which  non-selective  migration  thwarts  the
intended effects of an urban job creation cum minimum wage program.  A local
program  altering  relative  prices,  however,  may  also  induce  countervailing
changes  in  the  population  via  migration  selectivity;  e.g.,  a  locality  initiating
a program subsidizing health care might attract low-health households.  Lack of
attention to  selective migration thus makes  inferences about  the effectiveness
of a program to be  implemented nationally based on local  program initiatives
potentially misleading.2
Despite the  importance of location-choice  selectivity in local  public
goods theory and  in  the evaluation of  public programs, there  have been  few
attempts to  test directly for  the existence of  selective migration (an
exception  is  Schultz  (198 3))or  to test  predictions  for  how  migration  responds
selectively to changes in relative prices.  Yet, how the characteristics of
agents change across activities or locations  in response to relative prices,
i.e.,  the selectivity rules, are clearly dual  to the price-theoretic  implica-
tions for  the observable behavior  of  a given agent and  thus are themselves
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subject to verification.  In  this paper we consider how a price change or
program subsidy that  is location or site-specific affects the composition
of residents via selective migration and biases evaluations of  the effective-
ness of  the local program.  In particular, we assess the consequences of a
site-specific program subsidizing human capital  investment  in terms of shifts
in both population composition and a representative household's resource
allocations,when optimizing households that are heterogenous in preferences
and in their endowments of human capital are free to choose locations in
response to  changes in location-specific  prices.
In Section 1 the theoretical framework is described and implications are
derived for how population preferences and endowments  shift within a locality
in response to the human capital subsidy.  We show that under plausible assump-
tions and under all forms of heterogeneity a program subsidizing investments
in children attracts high-income households with small families;  children in
such households, ceteris paribus, may exhibit low or high levels of  human
capital, however, depending on whether the  principal source of heterogeneity
is  in tastesor endowments.  The  relationships between the biases in estimates
of  the program effects and  sources of heterogeneity  that arise from selective
migration are also derived.  In Section 2, unique longitudinal data from3
Colombia describing the consequences of a local health subsidy program
are used  to  test the  implications of migration selectivity.  The  findings
confirm the existence  of  selective migration.  The child  health care
program evidently induced in-migration by households characterized by high
income but, within  income groups, households  with low-fertility and  low
child health were attracted to the program site.  These migration patterns
are shown to be consistent with the hypothesis that heterogeneity in health
endowments dominates that in  tastes within the population.  We also show
that as a consequence of  this form of heterogeneity, the effectiveness of
the  program based on cross-child differences in health and program exposure
is considerably overestimated when selective migration is not taken into
account.
1.  Modeling Migrant Selectivity
a.  Heterogeneity  and  Migration  Selectivity:  Who  Migrates?
Consider an economy consisting of heterogenous households in spatial
equilibrium:  all potential profits from migration are zero;  i.e.,  no
household,  net  of migration costs, can increase its  income by changing
location.  Decisions by households are characterized by the static,  lifetime
optimization problem  in which the ith household maximizes
()  U (Hi  i  i  i
(1)  U (H , N , Z ;  a),
where N  =  number of  children in household i, H  =  average human capital of
children in i, Zi  =  composite consumption good and a  is a vector of household-
specific  taste parameters, subject  to the human capital production function
i  i  i  i), (2)  H =H(X ; 8,  ),4
where  X  is  the  per-child  human  capital  input,  B  is  the  household's  tech-
nology  parameter,  and  Vi  is  the  household's  human  capital  endowment,  and
the  lifetime  budget  constraint
(3)  Yi  P  Xi  +  PNN   +  Z1
i  3
where  Y  is  income,  P  is  the  input  price  and  PN  the  price  of  a  child.
x  N
Assume  that  all  prices  are  identical  across  all  locations  but  that  at
a  particular  site  a  program  is  initiated  which  pays  a  subsidy  s  per  unit  of
the  human  capital  purchased  input.  Each  household  not  at  the  program  site  now
faces  a  potential  migration  decision.  If  the  household  migrates  to  the  site,
S  S
the  price  of  the  human  capital  input  is  P  and  lifetime  income  is  Y  ,  where
Si
Y  is  income  at  the  program  site  net  of  the  cost  of migration  and  the  pro-
gram  tax,  which  is  assumed  to  be  lump-sum  and  levied  on  all  residents.
i  i  i  i
Let  V(P,. Y;  ;a ,  B,  P  )  be  the  indirect  utility  function  derived  from
maximizing  (1)  subject  to  (2)  and  (3);  the  difference  in  utility  dV  between
migrating  and  not  migrating  is  then:
i   i
i  VV  aV
(4)  dV1  =  - dPX  +  i dY
PX  ay
•v/  P
Roy's  identity,  i.e.,  - X  =  /Y  ,  yields  the  migration  decision  rule
(5)  migrate  iff  =  Xi(p  - P)  +  Y  - Y  >  0,
where  P<  P,  Y  <  Y.  If  the  subsidy  is  proportional  to  PX  (P  =  (l-s)  P  )
and  migration  cum  program  costs are  proportional  to  income  (Y  i  (1-C)  yi)
this reduces  to
PX  Ci
(6)  migrate  iff  ¥i  >  --
Yi  s
namely  that  the  household  migrates  if  and  only  if  the  income  share  of  the5
human  capital  input  is  at  least  as  large  as  the  ratio of  the  proportional
migration  cost  to  the  proportional  input  subsidy.  Notice  that  a  secondary
condition  for  migration  to  occur  is  that  C <  s.  If  the  subsidy  is  absolute
i
S  S  i  1
(P  =  P  - s)  and  the  migration  cost  is  also  absolute  (Y  *  Y  - C),
then  the  decision  rule  is
Ci i  C
(7)  migrate  iff  X  >--  .
Migration  rule  (7)  can  be  used  to derive  the  rules  for  migrant  selectivity
by  allowing  the  fundamental  taste,  technology  and  endowment  parameters  to
vary  in  response  to  changes  in  relative  prices  while  holding  constant  the
level  of  the  utility differential  between  the  origin  and  program sites.
The  characteristics  of  the  "marginal"  migrant  household,  the  household  that
is  just  indifferent  between  moving  to  the  site  or  not  migrating,  must  change
with  migration  costs  C  or  the  site  subsidy  s according  to:
dX  -l  1  C
(8)  dr  =  (  d)  1  dC  --  ds),  r  = a,  B,  ,  Y
s
where  superscripts  are dropped  to  indicate  that  (8)  describes  a  change  in
the  type  of  household  rather  than  the  response  of  a  given  household.
Clearly,  from  (8),  any  characteristics  of  the  household  that  increase
the  demand  for  the  human  capital  input  X  must  increase  as  C increases  or
must  decrease  as  s  increases  in  order  to  maintain  the  indifference.  To
discover  how  the  observable  characteristics  of  migrants  vary with  the
program  subsidy  and/or  migration  costs  it  is  thus  necessary  to  specify
how  the  unobservables  a,  p  and  B  affect  household  decision  rules.  Rosenzweig
and  Wolpin  (1982)  treated  the  special  case  where  the  human  capital  endow-
ment  is  additive,  i.e.,  H  =  H(X;  e)  +  V,  and  derived  general  expressions
for  the  influence  of  the  endowment  on  the  human  capital  input  and  on  fertility,
namelydK  X  I  dK  dK  1  1
(9)  d  -H  (  )  +  dK-1  H  >  0  H  <  0 dyi  - XX  dp  -   X  '  XX di1   H  X  dYK  x   xx
i  i K  X , N .
The  effects  of  V on  the  demand  for  X  and  N  thus  depend  on  the  usual
Hicks-Slutsky  compensated  price  and  income  effects.  If  the  fertility  and
the  human  capital  of  children  are  Hicks-Slutsky  substitutes,  as  has  often
been  found  (e.g.,  Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  (1980)),  and  income  effects  are
small  relative  to  price  effects,  then  a  reduction  in  migration  costs  and/or
an  increase  in  the  site  subsidy  would  attract  migrants  with  both  higher  human
capital  endowments  and  larger  family  size.  If  income  effects  dominate  price
effects,  and  are  positive,  then  lower  migration  costs  or  a  higher  site  sub-
sidy  induce,  within  income  groups,  less-endowed  and  lower-fertility  in-migrants.
To  generate  predictions  regarding  the  consequences  of  tastes  and  endow-
ment  heterogeneity  for  migration  selection  due  to  the  initiation  of  a  site-
specific  program  subsidy  requires  that  additional  structure  be  imposed  on  the
household  problem.  Consider  a  model  in  which  the  utility  function  is  quadratic
and  the  technology  is  linear  for  each  household  i:
2  2  2
(10)  U  L a  N  - a 2   +  a1   - aX 1   +  a  Z  - a  1 Z
and
(11)  H = B i   +  i
which  when  solved  in  terms  of  the  exogenous  parameters  yields  the  demand
equations:
ai  2  ii  i  i  i  i  i  i
()  3  2 a  4 )  + (  2(2a 6Y  - a  5 )  - 1  6)
(12)  X+
Bi2(a4• +  €  )1   ii
(13)i  0  +  PN  (2a  6Y   - a i 5  a  X  1
(13)  1   5  - -- 05)  _  Vx1
2) 1   6   • ,
2 i  £  i  1  2  1  i i  2
where  i(  +  (cx  +c  P  -1  IPx where2  6  a  N  p)  4  a26  2  6  >  0.  Note  that,  in  accord  with
most  empirical  findings,  X and  N vary  inversely.
Assume  that  there  is  potential  (unobserved)  population  heterogeneity
in  aC and  a 3 ,  reflecting  preferences  for  family  size  and  human  capital,  and
in  the  endowments  V  and  8.  Prior  to  the  introduction  of  the  program,  the
program-site  and  potential  migrant  populations  are  on  average  identical
with  respect  to  these  fundamental  parameters.  As  the  subsidy  is  raised
the  ceteris  paribus  changes  in  these  taste  and  endowment  parameters  and  in
income  (Y)  that  will  characterize  the  marginal  migmnt,  from  (8)  and  (12),
are  given  by  (14):
dal  C  2(a  4   +  *) --  1]pxp-  > 0 ds   s2   a16X N
dOc da3  C ds  2  [2a  +  4/9]  <  0
s  d
(14)
d  C>- d--  -- 2  [1  +  /04  ]  >  0 d  s  B
CP
dY  X
-d  - 2  [1  +  4q/]  <  0
d  2  2 -1
S  -tsC  [(a3  - 2pq)  (4  +  )  +  2BaP  (cla6PN +  a2(a  - 2a 6Y))]  [2s a(aAL  +  )  ].
Four  polar  cases  with  respect  to heterogeneity  are  of  interest:  Suppose
first  that  the  populations  are  heterogeneous  only  with  respect  to  tastes  for
family  size  and  human  capital  investments  in  children.  Specifically,  let  only
i  i
a  or  a  3  differ  across  households.  From  (14),  as  the  subsidy  increases,  the8
migrant  population  as  it  becomes  less  selective  will  be  composed  of  increasingly
higher  a 1  and  increasingly  lower  a3  households.  If  tastes  are  the  only  source
of  heterogeneity,  observationally  identical  migrant  households  will  thus  have
fewer  children  who  on  average  will  be  of  higher  "quality",  since  dN/dal,
dX/da 3  >  0  by  construction,  and
dNi  a6  NX
da3  28(a 41  +  )
(15)
dXi  a6PXPN
da  2(a $  +  )
With  heterogeneity  in  the  additive  health  endowment  V only,  increasing
the  subsidy  and  thus  reducing  selectivity will  draw  households  with  higher
endowments,  since  more  endowed  households,  for  given  money  income,  will  have
a  lower  demand  for  X:
dXi  -1
(16)  di  =-[8(1  +  P/cQ)]  <  0.
In  contrast  to  the  tastes  heterogeneity  scenario,  lower-P  households,  despite
their  higher  demand  for  human  capital  inputs,  will  always  have  children
characterized  by  lower  levels  of  human  capital,  as
dH  dX
(17)  i  1  +  -i=  [l  +  4  1o4/]  >  0.
When  there  is  heterogeneity  in  the  additive  endowment,  migrants  attracted  by
the  program  subsidy  will  thus  be  observed  to  have  lower  levels  of  human
capital.  They  will  also  have,  as  in  the  first  case,  fewer  children  since,
as  indicated  in  (7),  high-X  households  always  migrate  and,  from  (13),  X and
N  vary  inversely.
When  heterogeneity  exists  solely  in  8,  the  return  to  the  input  X,  in-migrant
households  may  have  either  lower  or  higher  levels  of  human  capital  (express-
ion  (14)).  However,  whether  or  not  high-8  (and  thus  high-H)  or  low-s  (and9
thus  low-H) households demand higher levels of  the X input and thus migrate
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to  the  program,  such migrant  households  will have  smaller  families.  A
human capital subsidy program will thus tend to  attract and  to  serve dispro-
portionally  households  within  income  groups  characterized  by  low  fertility
whether  heterogeneity  exists  in  tastes  or  in  human  capital  endowments.
If the principal source of heterogeneity is in the  latter, however, the
program may attract, within income groups, households with lower levels of
human capital, while tastes heterogeneity implies  that the program will
principally serve  children already characterized by higher levels of human
capital.
Independent  of any heterogeneity in unobserved, fundamental parameters,
however,  if  income  effects  are  positive  (as they  are  in  the  model),  migrants
will have relatively high income.  In the third polar case of no heterogeneity,
migrants will thus tend  to have larger families and  children with higher
levels  of  human  capital,  as  long  as  the  program  contains  no  means  test  pro-
visions, but within income groups migrant and resident households will appear
identical.
b.  Program  Effectiveness  and  Program  Effects
Consider now the problem of evaluating a human capital  subsidy program
when  the  program  is  located  at  a  specific  site  and  migration  is  potentially
self-selective.  The  average  human  capital  h in  a  population  of  obser-
vationally identical migrants and residents at  the program site  is given by:
(18)  h =  fhM  +  fRhR,
where fM and  fR are the relative proportions of  (post-program) migrants
and  (pre-program) residents in the population respectively and hM and hR10
are  their  average  human  capital  levels.  Note  that  hM is  the  truncated
mean  of  the  non-site  and  site  populations  when  such  populations  have  the  same
distribution prior  to  the  program.  A change  in  the  subsidy,  s,  will  induce
a  change  in  the  average  human  capital  stock  according  to:
dh  dfM  dhM
ds  ds(19)  =  yR  d-  (hM-  hR  M  +  f(YM-  YR )   fM  'ds
where  YR  and  yH  are  the  respective  average  program  subsidy  effects  on  the
levels  of  human  capital  in  the  resident  and  migrant  populations;  i.e.,
-BdX/dPx,  dfM/ds  is  the  shift  in  the  proportion  of  migrants  in  the  popula-
tion  due  to  a  change  in  program  attractiveness,  and  dhM/ds  is  the  change  in
the  mean  human  capital  of  the  migrant  population  due  to  migrant  selectivity;
i.e.,  (dr/ds) (dh/dr)  from  (8),  where  T  =  a,  i,  B.
The  total  effect  of  a  change,  in  the  locally-implemented  program  subsidy
on  the  average  human  capital  in  the  site  population,  given  by  (19),  thus
depends  on  (i)  the  direct  effect  of  the  subsidy  on  human  capital  investments
by  the  original,  resident  population,  (ii)  the  magnitude  of  the  compositional
change  in  the  population  via  migration  that  is  induced,  weighted  by  the  differ-
ential  in  mean  human  capital  levels  between  the  migrant  and  resident  populations,
(iii) the  magnitude  and  sign  of  the  difference  in  mean  program  effects  in  the
two  sub-populations,  and  (iv)  the  changes  in  the  mean  human  capital  of  the
migrants  caused  by  the arrival  of  new,  selectively  drawn  migrants,  who
will  differ  from  those  migrants  already  present.  The  average  "effectiveness"
of  a  program  subsidy,  the  effect  of  the  program  if  it  were  not  site-selective
(provided  in  all sites  ("globally"))  is  given  only  by  the  first  term  in  (19),
if  all  pre-program  site  populations  have  the  same  mean  characteristics  or
if  the  pre-program  site  population  is  representative.  It  is  thus  clear  that
the  bias  in  the  estimate  of  program  effectiveness  based  on  the  program's11
site-specific  effects,  given  by  the  sum  of  the  last  three  terms  in  (19),
will  depend  on  the  source  and  magnitude  of  heterogeneity  in  the  overall
population  and  on  household  decision  rules.
In  the  case  in  which  taste  heterogeneity  dominates  (variation  in
a3 ) ,  the  expression  for  the  bias,  derived  from  the  model  described  by
(10)  and  (11),  is: df  f dh  dfM  M  -
(20)  - - R  (a 3 M-  aR)  (a4  +  ds)-  +  (1  +  4 /,)-  ]
SC
M s  2 - f
where  a3M  and  a3R  are  the  mean  human  capital  taste  parameters  for
migrants  and  residents.  The  selectivity  equation  (14)  implies,  as  noted,
that  migrants  Vill  have  higher  average  tastes  for  human  capital  (a3M  >  a3R.
Thus  the  first  term  in  (20)  is  positive,  since  a  higher  subsidy  attracts
more  high-a 3  and  thus  high-H  migrants  (dfM/ds  >  0).  Moreover,  the  (high-ac 3 )
migrants  react  more  positively  to  a  subsidy  than  do  residents.  The  last
term  in  (20),  i.e.,  dc 3 M/dS,  from  (14),  multiplied  by  dk/da3M,from  (11)
and  (12),  is  negative,  however,  reflecting  the marginal  decrease  in  the
selectivity of  the migrant population associated with the higher generosity
of  the  subsidy.  Since  this  last  term  is  a  second-order  effect,  (20)  implies
that  the  estimated  effect  of  a  site-specific  subsidy  on  human  capital  will
represent  an  upper  bound  estimate  of  the  effectiveness  of  the  same  program
applied  globally  when  variation  in  preferences  for  human  capital  is  the
principal  source  of  population  heterogeneity.  Due  to  tastes  heterogeneity,
locally-implemented  human  capital  subsidy  programs  will  thus  appear  more
efficacious than they really are  for the average or representative
household.12
When  heterogeneity  is  confined  exclusively  to  endowments,  however,
the  bias  derived  from  the  model  cannot  be  signed  even  when  the  source  of
heterogeneity  is  the  additive  endowment.  The  bias  in  that  case  is:
dh  i  - -U  L  1 df  f (21)  -   M  -
(21)  h  (S  0  (1+VoM/()  [  (a  +  0/0W)
ds  R  M  R  r  ds  P X  4
8Ce




where  and  pR  are  the  mean  human  capital  endowments  in  the  migrant
and  resident  populations.  In  this  case,  as  was  shown,  the  subsidy  attracts
low-endowment  (and  low-health)  migrants  (vU<  <R ) ;  however,  the  human
capital  investments  by  (less-endowed)  migrants  respond  more  strongly  to  the
subsidy  than  do  those  by  residents.  The  net  contribution  of  the  negative
compositional  change  and  the  positive  differential  in  subsidy  effects
to  the  program  effect  bias  cannot  be  predicted.  When  endowment  variation
is  predominant,  thenno  inferences  about  the  globally  applied  program
effect  on  human  capital  can  be  made  from  the  estimates  of  the  site-specific
program  effects,  unless  migration  selectivity  is  taken  into  account.
Therefore  unlike  in  the  previous  case,  when  there  is  endowment  heterogeneity,
a  human  capital  subsidy  program  could  lower  the  average  human  capital  in  the
population  at  the  site  in  which  it  is  implemented  as  a  result  of  migration
selectivity  even  if  it  augments  the  human  capital  of  any  randomly-selected
household.
Similar  expressions  can  be  derived  for  the  selectivity  biases  in  the
estimated  effects  of  a  human  capital  subsidy  on  family  size.  In  both  the
tastes  and  additive  endowment  heterogeneity  cases,  selective  migration  will
lead  to  a  negative  bias--the  human  capital  subsidy  attracts  low-fertility13
households  in both cases, as was shown, and  the negative response of fertility
to  the subsidy is  stronger in both the low-p and high-a3  households, who make
up the migrant population.  Selective migration is  likely to make a site-
specific human capital  subsidy program appear more anti-natalist than a similar
but globally-applied program.
2.  Empirical Application
a.  Migrant Selectivity
To test  the migration selection hypotheses requires a data set  that at
a  minimum identifies migrants and residents at a specific site or sites and
provides the characteristics of both groups before and after the implemen-
tation of and/or changes  in a public program.  In  1968, a program
providing  home-based  preventive  and  maternal  child  health  services  was
initiated in a small village  in Colombia, Candelaria, and detailed longi-
tudinal information was collected from 1968 to  1974  on the characteristics
of parents  and on the health of children aged less than six.  All households
present  in  Candelaria at  any time  during the seven-year period with a
child under six years of age were included in the program, in which nurse-
volunteers  ("promotoras") visited each household approximately every two
months.  Since  Candelaria  is a  small  village  which  serves  in  part  as  an
"intermediate" stopover  for  many  migrants  from  outlying  rural areas  to
Call,  information  on  opportunities  in  Candelaria  is  disseminated  relatively
rapidly  in  outlying  areas  and  in-migrants  make  up  a  significant  proportion
of  the  population.  While  the  Candelaria data  are  thus  unique  in  permitting
identification of in-migrants and residents and  in  providing  pre-program,
baseline  data  on  both  migrants  (at  time  of  entry)  and  residents,  there  is14
no  information  on  the  characteristics  of  migrants at  origin  or  of  the
general origin populations.  Thus,  the health of the  children of in-migrants
to  Candelaria  can  only  be  compared  to  Candelaria  residents,  although  com-
parisons of  the fertility of migrants with non-Candelaria, origin populations
are  feasible,  given  the availability  of  the  1973  Census  of  Colombia.
Pre-migration characteristics must also be estimated.
In  order  to  test  for  the  existence  of  as  well  as  to  characterize  the
source  of  migrant  selectivity,  if any,  arising  from  the  incentives  created
by the Candelaria program, we need to  compare, within observationally-
identical groups, the pre-program family size and some measure of  the  pre-
program human capital of the children of migrants (households who came to
Candelaria  after 1969)  and  residents  (households  residing  in  Candelaria  when
the  program  was  initiated  in  1968).  We use  the  age-standardized  weight  of
children as a measure of human capital,  since weight  is  the only health
outcome collected in all years of the program.  Because the standardization
required is  one  that  is  independent  of  the  program  and  relevant  to  the
population  studied,  the  average  weight  in  1968  of  (resident)  Candelaria
children  for  each  age-sex  group  is  used  as  the  standard; that  is,  the
age-weight  distribution  in  effect  at  the  initiation  date  of  the  program.
Since  some  ages  (in  months)  were  not  represented  in  this  group  and  others
had  relatively  small  sample  sizes,  a  fourth-order polynomial  regression  of
these mean age-specific weights for each sex group was used to smooth
the base.  A  child's weight-for-age was  thus defined as the  ratio of the
weight at  his/her own age  to the standard weight at  that age.
Table 1 provides the sample characteristics of resident and migrant
families.  As hypothesized in the previous section, migrant households have
higher  (age-standardized) incomes on  average, although the slope  of the
migrant  age-income  profile  is  less  steep  for  migrants.  Migrant  families  alsoTable  1
Sample  Characteristic:  Resident  and  Migrant  Families
Resident  Families  Migrant  Families
Variable/Statistic  Mean  S.D.  Mean  S.D.
Pre-program  children
ever  born
Pre-program  mean  child
weight-for-age,  0-6
Income
Income  when  entered
program
Log  of  income,  father
aged  20  years
Slope  of  log-income
profile,  father
aged  20  years
Curvature  of  log-income
profile  (xle- 3 )
Years  of  schooling-
mother
Years  of  schooling-
father
Age  of  mother
Age  of  father
Mean  program  exposure
of  children  0-6
(months)
Mean  proportion  of
lifetime  children
exposed  to  program















































had fewer children than resident families prior to entering the program and
lower fertility  than that  for all rural households in  Colombia  (1973 Census
of Colombia).  While  this differential  conforms  to  the prediction of  the
theoretical analysis  that  low-fertility households would be most attracted
to a program subsidizing human capital investments, whatever the principal
source of  heterogeneity, migrant parents are also on average younger, more
educated and wealthier  than resident parents.  Differences  in family size
may thus be  due to  these  differences in observed characteristics  and tests
for selectivity must be performed within observationally  identical groups.
Estimation of the household demand equations  for  fertility and health is
thus required to  investigate the sources of heterogeneity and selection.
As was demonstrated, the existence of heterogeneity in tastes,  tech-
nology and/or endowments  implies that all of  the coefficients of household
demand equations will be  family-specific.  This suggests  the following
estimating relationship:
S  ii  i
(22)  K =  X  g  +  E
where Ki is either the pre-program children ever born or (log) weight-for-
age variable  for family i, X  is  the  set of exogenous characteristics of the
household conditioning these choices, g  is  the  family-specific  parameter
i
vector, and E  is a random term.
It  is assumed  that:
(23) V  =
where  A16
This  is  the  standard  random coefficients  model;  the  estimating  equation  (22)
may  be  written  as
(24)  Ki  i  Yy  +
where  ci*a  (gi  - y)  Xi  +  c1 . Since  the  ci*'s  are heteroscedastic,  a  general-
ized  least  squares  (GLS)  estimator  will  yield  consistent  and  efficient
estimates  of  the  p's  and  o's.  Selectivity  implies  that  the  means  of  the
family-specific  parameters  y  will  differ  across  the  migrant  and  resident
populations.
The  demand  equations  (24)  must  be  modified  to  take  into  account  the
life-cycle  nature of  fertility  and  child  health  investment  decisions,  not
incorporated,  for  simplicity,  in  the  models  of  the  previous  section.
First,  health  is  a  stock  that  is  presumably  a  function  not  only  of  current
inputs  but  of  all  inputs  applied  in  the  past,and  current  family  size
also  reflects  past  fertility  decisions.  Thus,  the  reduced  form  health  and  fertility
demand  functionswill  contain  the  determinants  of  all  current  and  past  inputs.
Second,  in  a  life-cycle  context  with  perfect  foresight,  input  demand,
health  demand  and  fertility  decisions  at  any  point  in  the  life-cycle  will
depend  on  future,  current,  and  past  income  and  prices.  Log  income  age  profiles
were  thus  estimated  for  residents  and  migrants  separately  using  all  reported
income  data points  over  the  seven-year  sampling  period  and  information  on
occupation,  age  and  schooling  attainment.
For  migrants,  as  noted,  income  prior  to  migration  is  unavailable.  To  the
extent  that  there  is  an  important  structural  shift  in  the  income  profile  associ-
ated  with  migration,  the  profiles  of  migrants  may  be  misrepresented.  To  ascertain
if  this  absent  information  could  account  for  any  differences  in  parameter  esti-
mates  obtained  across  the  migrant  and  resident  populations,  we  also estimate17
a  child  health  equation  based  on  the  subsample  of  children  born  after  the  pro-
gram was  begun  and/or  after  migration  to  Candelaria.  For  this  subsample,
children  of  the  same  age  do  not  differ with  respect  to  their exposure  to  the
program  and  information  on  actual  family  income  is  available  for  every  year
of  the  child's life  whether  the  child  is  from  a  migrant  or  resident  household.
The  household  log  income profile is  measured  by  three  statistics:
the  constant  in  the  log  income  equation  evaluated  at  husband's  age  =
20,  the  first derivative  evaluated  at  husband's  age  =  20  and  the  second
derivative.  These  terms  differ  in  the  sample  by  the  level  of  husband's
education  and husband's  occupation.  Mother's  schooling  is  included  in
(24)  as  an  observable  characteristic  that  may  shift  tastes,  technology
or  endowment  parameters.  Mother's  age  is  also  included  in  the  children
ever  born  equation  as a  life-cycle  standardization;  it  is  not  included  in
the  weight-for-age  equation,  since  that  is  already  appropriately  age-
standardized.
Table  2  presents  the  relevant  random-coefficient  GLS  demand  equation
estimates,  the  first  column  for  fertility  (children  ever  born)  prior to
entry into  the  program and  the  second  column  for  the  pre-program  (log  of)
mean  child  weight-for-age.  The  third column  reports  OLS  estimates  for
the  (log  of)  standardized  child weight  for  children  born  after program
entry.  Only  OLS  estimates  are  reported  for  that  subsample  because  the  GLS
procedure  produced  a  large  number  of  negative  variance  estimates  of  household-
specific  parameters.  The  reported  t-values  in  column  3  may  therefore  be
biased,  although  the  coefficient  estimates  are  consistent.
The  three  specifications  reported  include  only  an  intercept  dummy  variable
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migrants  from  residents.  Regressions  which  are  fully  interactive  with  respect
to  the  residence  dummy,  as  are  indicated  by  the  theory,  were  also  estimated,
but  are  not  reported  since  the  overall  story  is  unchanged  with  the  more  par-
simonious  specification.  Most  of  the  estimates  of  the  individual  interaction
coefficients  were  not  measured  with  much  precision;  however,  F-tests  reject
at  the  five  percent  significance  level  the  hypothesis  that  the  migrant  and
resident  pre-program  demand  equations  are  identical.  Migrant  selectivity  is
indicated.
The  set  of  resident  dummy  coefficients  reported  in  Table  2  conform  to
the  scenario  in  which  endowment  heterogeneity  dominates  tastes  hetero-
geneity.  Within  income/schooling  groups,  migrants  to  Candelaria  had  both
lower  pre-program  family  size  and  children  with  lower  age-standardized  weight
upon  entry  and  after  compared  to  residents.  These  findings  thus  suggest  that
the  immigrants  drawn  to  Candelaria  were  selected  not  only  from  the  upper  tail
of  the  income  distribution  (Table  1),  but,  within  income  groups,  were  self-
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selected  from  the  lower  tail  of  the  endowment  (i)  distribution.  Evidently,
the  slightly  higher  child  weight  observed  for  migrants  at  entry  in  Table  1
is  due  to  the  higher  household  income  of  migrants;  the  estimated  income
level  coefficients  in  columns  2  and  3  confirm  that  higher  income  households
value  health  human  capital  more  highly  (one-tail  test,  five  percent  level).
b.  Evaluation  of  the  Effectiveness  of  the  Candelaria  Program
The  single-site  sample  design  of  the  Candelaria  data  set  would  appear
to  preclude  any  evaluation  of  the  promotora  program,  since  all  households
face  the  same  subsidy.  However,  in  a  life-cycle  context  the  total  subsidy
varies  across  children  to  the  extent  that  children  of  the  same  age  were
exposed  to  the  subsidy  for  different  lengths  of  time,  a  greater  number  of19
health  inputs  being  subsidized  for  children  within  the  same  age  group  but
exposed  earlier  to  the  program.  There  are  thus  two  sources  of  variations
in  the  total  program  subsidy:  First,  since  the  dissemination  of  information
about  the  Candelaria  program  to  outlying  areas  and  migration  itself takes
time,  children  of migrants,  while  facing  the  same  subsidy  as  the  children
of  residents  when  they  arrive,  will  not  be  exposed  to  the  program  for  the
same  length  of  time,  given  their  ages,  as  resident  children.  This  differ-
ential  is  evident  in  Table  1;  mean  months  of  program  exposure  for migrant
children  is  less  than  60  percent  that  of  resident  children.  Since  our
results  indicated  that  migrant  children  have  lower  health  (due  to  selection),
use  of  the  cross-child variation  in  program  exposure  to  assess  the  impact
of  the  program  without  attention  to  migrant  selectivity would  appear  to
result  in  an  upward  bias  in  the  estimate  ofprogram  effectiveness.  However,
we  also  showed  that  low-P  households  may  respond  more  positively to  a  human
capital  subsidy;  the  direction  of  the  selectivity bias  in  the  program  exposure
estimate  is  thus  ambiguous.
The  second  source  of variation  in  program  exposure  arises  from  variation
in  the  birth dates  of  resident  children  who  were  born  prior  to  the  program
(1968).  For  such  children,  the  sample  would  appear  to  approximate  an
experimental  design  as  long  as  the  program  was  unanticipated.  However,  since
children  born  at  later  dates  on  average  are  born  later  in  their  parents'
life-cycle,  the  cross-sectional  variation  in  program  exposure  among  resident
children  may  also  be  correlated  with  their health  endowments  or  with  parental
preferences  for health,  if  these  characteristics also  influence  the  timing
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and  spacing  of  births.  A relationship  between  program  exposure  and  health
might  thus  exist  in  the  absence  of  any  true  program  effect  even  among  children
of  residents.20
To  assess  the  consequences  of  migration  selectivity for  estimating  the
effectiveness  of  the  Candelaria  program  thus  requires  attention  to  both
sources  of  potential  bias  arising  from  the  use  of  exposure  information  to
measure  subsidy differentials.  The  longitudinal  data  on  the  health  of
individual  children  permits  this  separation.  Consider  the  reduced  form
estimating  equation  for  child-specific health:
(25)  Hij  yi  Eij  +  J  +  Ei
where  Hi  is  the  health  of child  j  in  family  i,  Eij  is  the  length  of  program
exposure,  yi  is  a  random  coefficient  on  exposure,  ji  is  a  child-specific
health  endowment,  and  i j  is  a  random  time-varying  health  component.  All
other  family  characteristics  are  suppressed  for  simplicity.  Population  hetero-
geneity  implies  that  y  differs  across  children  if  health  endowments
differ,  since,  as  we  have  shown,  the  effect  of  s  on  the  demand  for  the  human
capital  input  X  depends  upon  fundamental  parameters.  Program  exposure,
which  depends  on  the  child's  date  of  birth  and/or  on  the  timing  of  migration,
may  be  correlated  with  the  unobserved  health  endowment  as  a  result  of  timing
and  spacing  decisions  and  migration  selectivity.  With  multiple  observations
for  each  child,  however,  a  random  coefficients  fixed  effect  estimator  can
be  used  to  purge  out  the  family  and  child-specific health  endowment. 1 2
Rewriting  (25)  in  differential  form  yields
(26)  AHij  =  j  AEij  +  Aci.
GLS  estimation  of  equation  (24)  provides  a  consistent  estimate  of  the  program
exposure  effect  for  the  sample  of  resident-household  children.  However,
if migrant-household  children  are  included  in  the  sample,  the  distribution
of  the  yij's  will  be  truncated  when  migrant  households  are  not  randomly21
drawn.  This  leads  to  the  standard  sample  selection problem,  since
E[(y  - Y)  AEi J  +  Ac  migrant]  0.
To  obtain  a  consistent  estimate  of  the  program  exposure  effect,  and
thus  the  effectiveness  of  the  program,  it  is  thus  necessary  to  restrict
attention  to  resident  children  born  prior  to  the  program  or  to  attempt  to
correct  for  the  sample  (migration)  selection.  We  refrain  from  employing  one
of  the  standard  sample  selection  correction  procedures  (Heckman,  1979;  Olsen,
1980)  since  that  would  entail  imposing  further,  and  arbitrary,  structure  on
the  problem.  The  resident  subsample  should  be  large  enough  to  permit  precise
estimation  of  the  program  exposure  effect  and  thus  an  assessment  of  bias  due
to  selective  migration.
Table  3  reports  estimates  of  the  program  exposure  effects  for  both  the
full  sample  of  children  (inclusive  of  migrants)  and  the  sample xf  resident
children.  Estimates  from  two  specifications are  reported,  a  linear  speci-
fication  in  which  the  exposure  effect  is  assumed  to  be  identical across
education/income  groups  and  an  interactive  specification,  which  allows
exposure  effects  to  differ  by  parental  characteristics,  as  is  consistent with
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our  linear-quadratic  example.3  Both  specifications  are  estimated  using
ordinary  least  squares  and  the  GLS  random-coefficient  fixed effect  estimator
FE-RC).  For both samples and both estimation procedures, however, F-tests
reject  the  linear  specifications;  Table  4  reports  the  per-month  exposure
effects  on  standardized  weight  by  income  levels  implied  by  the  interactive
estimates.
Comparisons  across  samples  and  across  estimates  permit  an  assessment
of  the  separate  roles of  migrant  selectivity and  within-group  heterogeneity.
Whatever  the  specification or  estimation  procedure,  however,  estimatesTable  3
Migrant  Selectivity  and Prograa  Exposure  Effects  on  Log  of  Child  Weight-for-Age
Sample:  Migrants  +  Residents  Rlsidents
Estimation  Procedure  OLS  OLS  F.E.  F.E.  OLS  OLS  F.E.-R.C.  F.E.-R.C.
Exposure  (months  x  10-)  .116
(10.58)"
-1.59  .408  -1.67
(1.95)  (37.63f  (2.02)f
.073,  -4.99  .00786  3.57
(5.56)  (0.43)  (0.lf  (5.36)
b
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7583  7583 6126  6126 4540  4540  1877  1877
a  Absolute  values  of  t-ratios beneath  regression  coefficients.
b  Absolute  values  of  asymptotic  t-ratios  beneath  regression  coefficients.Table  4
Exposure  Effects  by  Income  Level:  Percent
Standardized  Weight  per  Montha
Change  in
Exposures  Migrants  +  Residents  Residents
Estimation  Procedures  OLS  Fixed  Effect  OLS  Fixed  Effect
Two  o  above  the  mean  .0081  .376  .015  .015
One  o  above  the  mean  .0056  .337  .0071  .080
Mean  -. 057  .298  .0005  .145
One  a  below  the  mean  -. 089  .258  -. 008  .211
Two  a below  the  mean  -. 121  .218  -. 016  .276
a  Evaluated  at  mean  mother's  education.22
from the  sample  including both migrants and residents greatly  overstate
on average the  health consequences of  program exposure net of migration
selection effects, with the greatest differential displayed by the  fixed
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effect estimates.  Moreover, the patterns of  exposure effects by income
revealed by the fixed effect estimates taken from the resident and full
samples  are  quite  different  (Table  4)  --  the  per-month  exposure  effects
decline by  income group in the full sample but increase with income in  the
resident sample.15
The fixed effect random coefficients model estimated in the residents-
only  sample, which is presumably  free of  selection and heterogeneity biases,
indicates that a child exposed for  1.5 years to  the Candelaria program
(the  sample mean  for residents) and  who lives  in a household with an
income level  two  standard deviations below the Candelaria mean would
experience a five percent gain in weight-for-age; a similarly-exposed
child  from a household with income at the mean would experience a 2.6
percent increase in weight-for-age, while children from households with
incomes more than two standard deviations above the mean would benefit
16
little from the program.  The comparable full sample estimates imply
that migrant  selectivity leads to an overestimate of the program exposure
effect  by 2400  percent among households with incomes at  least two standard
deviations above the mean, and a 106 percent  overestimate at  the mean,
while the  exposure effect  is  understated by 21  percent among households
with incomes less than two standard deviations below the mean.  The program
thus appears  to have benefited most  the children of poor residents and  wealthy
migrants, and to have attracted, among wealthy potential migrants, those
who benefit most  from the program and, among poor potential migrants,
those who benefit  least.23
3.  Conclusion
When  agents  are  heterogeneous,  a  change  in  relative  prices within  a
discrete  geographical  area  or  activity  has  two  distinct  effects.  It  alters
the  allocation  of  resources  by  each  agent  facing  the  price  change  and  changes
the  composition  of  agents  within  the  location  or  activity.  While  most
empirical  studies  have  been  concerned  with  testing  the  allocative  responses
of  a  representative  agent  to  changes  in  incentives,  the  change  in  the
spatial distribution of  differentiated  agents  in  response  to  area-specific
conditions,  the  central  implication  of  the  Tiebout  hypothesis,  has  received
little  theoretical  development  or  empirical  verification.  In  this  paper  we
have  explored  the  consequences  of  a  site-specific  program subsidizing
human  capital  investments  in  children  for  both  the  spatial  distribution of
heterogenous  households  and  for  the  level  of  human  capital  investment  by
a  representative  household.  We  show  that with  plausible  restrictions  on
the  optimizing  behavior  of  each  household,  such  a  program  precipitates  in-
migration  by  high-income  and  low-fertility  households,  whether  the  principal
form  of  heterogeneity  is  in  tastes  or  in  human  capital  endowments.  With
endowment  heterogeneity  dominant,  however,  households  also  characterized
by  low  levels  of  human  capital and/or  with  smaller  returns to  investments
in  human  capital  are attracted  to  a  program subsidizing  human  capital
investment.
Data  from  a  village  in  Colombia  that  implemented  a  subsidized  health
program  confirm  these  implications  of  selective  migration--in-migrants  were
evidently drawn from the low-tail of  the family size distribution, were
of  relatively  high  income  and,within  income  groups,had  children  whose24
nutritional  status  was  lower  than  that  of  observationally  identical  members
of  the  resident  population.  As  a  consequence,  evaluations  of  the  program
inattentive  to  migration  selectivity  based  on  differences  in  program  ex-
posure  across  children  born  prior  to  the  program  were  shown  to  significantly
overestimate  the  impact  of  the  program  for  any  randomly-drawn  household.
Program  evaluations  based  oncomparisons  of  the  mean  nutritional  status
of  children  born  after  the  program  with  that  of  children  born  prior  to
the  program  and  never  exposed  to  it,  however,  would  seriously  understate
the  effectiveness  of  the  program  due  to  the  selective  migration  of  low-
endowment  households.  Indeed,  the  empirical  results  suggest  that  it  is
possible  that  the  equilibrium  mean  health  of  children  in  the village,  due
to  migration,  will  be  lower  after  than  before  the  health  program,  with  mean
health  levels  increased  in  areasexternal  to  the  program  site.
Our  empirical  results  suggest  that  in  a  country  such  as  Colombia  or
the  United  States  where  the  population  is  highly  mobile,  tests  of  theories
of  the  behavior  of  individual  agents  based  on  cross-sectional  data  or
studies  of  the  determinants  or  consequences  of  laws  based  on  the  exogenous
spatial  distribution  of  population  characteristics  may  be  seriously  flawed.
The  existence  of  migration  selectivity  has  implications  beyond  those  relevant
to  the estimation of  behavioral models  from cross-sectional data or to
the  evaluation  of  location-specific  programs,  however.  Consider  a  national
immigration  policy,  for  example,  that  does  not  discriminate  by  an  immigrant's
country  of  origin.  Due  to differences  in  migration  costs  (distance)  and
in  relative  prices  across  potential  sending  countries,  immigration  will  be
differentially  self-selective  across  country-of-origin  groups.  Such  dif-
ferential  selectivity  will  result  in  the  observed  behavior  of  immigrants25
being  correlated  with  their  country-of-origin  (Chiswick  (1978))  even  if  the
distributions  of  population  characteristics  in  sending  countries  are  identical.
Moreover,  our  framework  implies  that  an  overall  increase  in  barriers  to
immigration  makes  immigration  more  selective.  How  immigrants  differ  by
country-of-origin  or  whether  the  laissez-faire  selectivity  arising  from
the  decision-rules  of  optimizing  potential  immigrants  is  superior  or  in-
ferior  to  selection  imposed  by  law  depend  on  the  sources  of  heterogeneity
and  the  nature  of  the  relative  price  differentials  across  the  sending  and
receiving  countries.  If  immigrants  are  principally  attracted  by  a  country's
superior  opportunities  for  human  capital  investment,  for  example,  our  results
imply  that  immigrants  may  be  drawn  from  the  lower  tails  of  the  human  capital
endowment,  distribution;  however,  the  less  so  the  smaller  the direct  costs
of  immigrating.
Finally,  selective  migration  is  a  component  of  a  broader  class  of
problems.  For  example,  as  for  migration,  relative  price  changes  as  well
as  income  growth  may  selectively  alter  fertility  decisions,  resulting  in  a
change  in  the  distribution  of  children  across  households  of  differing  endow-
ments  and  pref  erences  for  human  capital  investment,  and  thus  in  the  endow-
ments  of  the  representative  child.  The  long-term  consequences  of  national
programs  may  thus  differ  significantly  from  their  immediate  effects  due
to  selectivity  in  fertility  decisions.  The  further  study  of  selection  rules
would  appear  warranted.26
Footnotes
1.  Gramlich  and  Rubinfeld  (1982)  test  and  confirm  an  implication  of  selective
migration, that  the variance  in voter preferences  for local public  goods
expenditures are  smaller within than among urban localities, but  do
not test whether and/or how the  local electoral outcomes affect  residen-
tial mobility.  Schultz  (1983) tests for and confirms differences in
behavior between migrants and residents in  Colombia by origin and
destination but does not incorporate migration decisions within his
behavioral model or derive predictions  for how interarea price differ-
ences  generate  selectivity  rules.
2.  While heterogeneity and selection, combined with information asymmetries,
, form the  basis for many models of behavioral phenomena  (e.g., Spence
(1973);  Guasch and Weiss  (1981)),  that literature has  seen little  empirical
application.  Heterogeneity  and  selection  are  also  explicitly  recognized
in most econometric  studies of labor  supply behavior;  however, selectivity
is essentially treated as a nuisance rather than as a testable implication
of  the  theory (an exception is Heckman (1974)).
3.  The budget constraint ignores  the interaction between the human capital
of children and the number of children,  as  in Becker and Lewis  (1973).
Use of  the non-linear budget constraint does not  alter any of the
testable implications of  the model (Rosenzweig and Wolpin  (1980)).
4.  It  is easy to demonstrate that households with higher returns to  the
human capital input X will always have higher levels of human capital.
However, the higher return  induces both an income effect, lowering the
demand  for X so as  to allocate the higher wealth to the  increased con-
sumption of other  goods, and a price effect, which raises the  demand for27
X.  Note  that  the  additive  endowment  only  carries  with  it  an  income
effect;  higher  V households  are  wealthier  and  have  healther  children
but  do  not  obtain  more  human  capital  per  unit  of  the  input.
5.  The  subsidy  effect  on  health,  from  (12),  is
dh  /ds =  8[2(ai3-  2~ia  )  ia 2 4 6 P X  1  4  -(  (-  Ba)  (a2  5  - 2a26Y  +
-1
ala6PN) ]  [2(8a 4 q  +  )] 1 ,
from  which  subsidy-effect  differentials  can  be  computed  when  a  and  J differ.
6.  dhM/ds  (da3M/ds)  (dhM/da3M)  =   C/s 2
7.  The  program  was  funded  by  the  U.S.  Agency  for  International  Development;
Candelaria  residents  and  in-migrants  thus  did  not  incur  any  direct  pro-
gram  costs.
8.  Various  health  programs  had  been  in  operation  in  Candelaria  before,  but  not
after, the  implementation  of  the  "promotora"  program.  As  a  consequence,
rates  of  malnourishment  and  fertility  in  Candelaria  were  lower  than  in
the  overall  population  in  Colombia  prior  to  1968  (Heller  and  Drake  (1979).
Since  in  our  sample  only  post-1968  migrants  can  be  identified,  recent
but  pre-1968  migrants  attracted  to  the  prior  health  programs  will  be
counted  as  residents;  differences  between  residents  and  post-1968
migrants  will  thus  underestimate  the  selectivity  induced  by  a  health
subsidy  program.
9.  As  noted  above,  the  existence  of  pre-1968  programs  minimizes  the  esti-
mated  health  differential  between  the  post-1968  migrants  and  the  pre-1968
residents  in  Candelaria  since  some  proportion  of  the  latter  were  attracted
by  the  prior  health  programs.  However,  while  the  estimates  in  Table  2
are  thus  lower  bound  estimates  of  the  migrant-resident  health  differential,
it  is  possible  that  migrants  are  not  drawn  from  the  lower  tail  of  the28
health endowment distribution characterizing the  non-Candelaria origin
populations, since  these populations exhibit  lower mean health than do
the  residents  in  Candelaria.  The  Colombian  Census  data  indicate  that
post-1968 migrants to Candelaria do exhibit  lower  fertility than  in the
rural population  as a whole as well as  in the  Candelaria resident
population.
10.  That  spacing  patterns  are  related  to  household  health  endowments  in
Candelaria  households  is  shown  in  Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin  (1984).
11.  Heller  and  Drake  (1979)  exploit  differences  in  program  exposure  among
children  to  evaluate  the  effectiveness  of  the  Candelaria program.  They
ignore  the  selectivity  associated  with  both  migration and parental
spacing  decisions.  Their  specifications  estimate  program  exposure
effects  conditional  on  such  endogenous  variables  as  parental  breast-
feeding, use of medical  services, and food expenditures;  their  findings
thus cannot  be compared with our reduced-form estimates.
12.  A  within-family  (cross-child)  fixed  effect  estimator  would  not  provide
consistent estimates  if endowments differ among children and the spacing
of  children  responds  to  realizationsof  child-specific  endowments.  In
that case,  a child's health outcome will affect the  interval to  the next
child  so  that  the  difference  in  program  exposure  between  children  within
the same family will be related  to  their relative health as part of  the
family's optimization process and regardless of  the program.  Evidence
on these dynamic  spacing patterns  is presented in Rosenzweig  and Wolpin
(1984).
13.  The  subsidy effect,  given in footnote  5, depends on fundamental parameters
as well as on  income.29
14.  Similar  results are obtained when the fraction of  the  child's life during
which  he  or  she  is  exposed  to  the  program  is  used  to  measure  exposure.
With  either  measure,  identification  of  the  program  effect  arises  from
the nonlinear relationships among age, exposure and weight  induced by
the age/sex standardization.
15.  These differential program effects by income level  are not due  to program
design but reflect  the  nonlinearity in income of  the  input demand
equation.
16.  Part of the impact of  the program appears  to work via encouraging greater
and/or more rapid investments in children.  Fixed effect  (logit) estimates
indicate  that children of  the same  age but exposed longer  to  the program
were  more  likely  to  be  receiving  breastmilk  and  to  have  received  innocu-
lations against diptheria, polio or  tetanus.30
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